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ATSB: Virgin 737 Touched Down About 1,175 m Long at Gold Coast

ATSB investigation AO-2023-018, released 19 November 2026, says VH-YQM touched down about 1,175 m beyond the displaced threshold. Safety issue AO-2023-018-SI-01, on reflective runway markings, is Closed – Not addressed.

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Updated November 20, 2026

4 min read

News. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau released its final report on 19 November 2026 into a long landing by a Virgin Australia Boeing 737-800, VH-YQM, at Gold Coast Airport on 24 January 2023. The report says the aircraft touched down about 1,175 m beyond the displaced threshold of runway 32, about 550 m beyond the latest point of touchdown the crew had nominated. On the same day the bureau closed the related safety issue on reflective runway markings as not addressed.

It was a scheduled flight from Sydney. The first officer was flying and the captain was monitoring. They flew the RNP X runway 32 (AR) approach in a thunderstorm, with heavy rain and dark conditions. They saw the runway at about 500 ft, above the 360 ft decision altitude. The autopilot stayed on below that altitude and came off at about 190 ft.

How the ATSB describes the landing

The report says that about 11 minutes before the landing the local QNH changed. The automatic terminal information service was not updated, and air traffic control did not pass the change to the crew. The aircraft was about 35 ft higher than indicated. The ground-based precision approach path indicator was likely showing the aircraft above the glidepath. The crew were very likely following the glidepath on the aircraft instruments, below the decision altitude, rather than the PAPI. They did not correct the path. The aircraft crossed the threshold about 37 ft above the PAPI flightpath. The ATSB says that extra height added about 215 m before touchdown, and that this extra distance was not enough on its own to make it a long landing.

The flare is the larger slice. At about 44 ft the first officer started the flare, about 24 ft above the recommended 20 ft. The aircraft floated. The report says that produced an additional 635 m before touchdown. Combined with the high approach, touchdown was about 1,175 m beyond the displaced threshold, about 550 m past the latest nominated point, which cut the stopping distance.

The crew suspected a long landing and were not sure, because they could not see the touchdown zone markings. They recalled seeing the markings on late final, then losing them in the flare. The report says a film of water likely made the surface reflective, and the dark conditions likely hid the paint. Those markers were the only visual aid to the zone. The captain likely saw that the autobrake setting was not enough, took manual control and applied maximum braking. The ATSB says that likely prevented a runway overrun. The aircraft left on taxiway C. The report also says high workload, and likely fatigue for the captain, worked against two chances to go around.

The reflective-marking issue, in the ATSB's words

The markings did not contain reflective material, and they were not required to. Safety issue AO-2023-018-SI-01 is "Requirements for the visibility of runway markings as visual aids." The description is: "While recommended by the International Civil Aviation Organization, there was no Australian guidance for airport operators on considering the use of reflective materials to enhance the visibility of runway markings as visual aids for operations at night, especially in conditions when the markings may be wet."

The issue owner is CASA. The status is "Closed – Not addressed." The date released is 19 November 2026. The status justification is: "The Civil Aviation Safety Authority advised that it has reviewed its guidance material related to aerodrome markings and assessed that no changes were required. As such, the ATSB has closed the safety issue as not addressed."

CASA's advice, recorded on that page, says a review "identified that there wasn't any significant support for change within CASA documentation," and that the matter was placed on the October 2026 National Runway Safety Group agenda. The ATSB calls the unchanged guidance "a missed opportunity to encourage aerodrome operators to consider the use of reflective materials." Safety advisory notice AO-2023-018-SAN-001 encourages operators to consider reflective materials on runways used at night, particularly where the runway may also be wet.

What the closure does and does not say

"Not addressed" means CASA's review did not change the guidance. It is not a finding that reflective paint would have changed this landing. The report says nothing prohibited reflective materials, and that "the lack of such guidance material did not directly influence this incident." A second issue, AO-2023-018-SI-02, covers the tower QNH alert. This article does not assign it a closure label.

Sources

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