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Dutch Digital Inspector Opens a GPS Inquiry After Reports on 9 November

The RDI says aircraft GPS interference was reported on 9 November 2026 between 18:15 and 18:30, safety was not at issue, and it will not comment further during the inquiry. AeroTime's account of seven Schiphol RNP approaches is AeroTime's, citing Dutch air traffic control. Crew briefing below is EASA's published guidance, not a local procedure.

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Updated November 20, 2026

4 min read

Analysis. The Dutch Authority for Digital Infrastructure has opened an investigation into reports of GPS interference with aircraft on 9 November 2026. Its notice does not say seven approaches, and it does not name Schiphol. A separate AeroTime report, citing Dutch air traffic control, does. The briefing points at the end of this piece are general recommendations already published by EASA. They are not a procedure written for this evening, and they are not instructions from the Dutch inspector.

What the RDI notice says

The Rijksinspectie Digitale Infrastructuur published a short notice on 16 November 2026, timed 15:30. It says the inspectorate, working with other parties, has started an investigation into reports of interference in aircraft GPS signals. It says those reports concern Monday 9 November 2026, between 18:15 and 18:30. It says aviation safety was not at issue, because the aircraft could use secondary systems that could replace the disturbed GPS signal. It says no further statements will be made during the investigation.

The notice does not name an airport, an approach type, an aircraft count, or a source, and it does not label the timezone.

What AeroTime reported on top of that

AeroTime reported on 16 November that seven flights on approach to Amsterdam Schiphol had problems with satellite-based navigation, according to Dutch air traffic control. It said an LVNL spokesperson told NRC, which first reported the incident on 15 November, that required navigation performance approaches at Schiphol were disrupted, and that deliberate jamming was a plausible cause. All seven landed safely with controller help, AeroTime said, and LVNL said there were no consequences for flight safety.

AeroTime also said tracking analysis cited by Belgian broadcaster VRT NWS put degraded satellite navigation at about 80 aircraft over the Netherlands, Belgium, eastern England and north-western Germany, most of them high. It said analyst John Wiseman placed the event between 18:08 and 18:27 local time, with a possible source in the North Sea about 80 to 110 nautical miles north of Texel, consistent with a ship, and that the location was uncertain.

The RDI notice does not adopt the seven approaches, the RNP detail, the figure of about 80, or a North Sea source. Those stay as AeroTime reported them.

What crews already have in published guidance

This section is analysis of guidance that exists independently of the Dutch notice. It is not a Schiphol checklist, and it does not add steps the RDI did not publish.

EASA Safety Information Bulletin 2022-02R4, issued 3 July 2026 and corrected on 22 July 2026, covers GNSS jamming and spoofing that can degrade communication, navigation and surveillance. EASA says there is no flight-crew alert that tells the crew which of the two is occurring. Jamming, intentional radio interference, typically shows up quickly because receivers stop locking onto satellites. Spoofing, counterfeit signals that produce false position, navigation and timing, can be harder to see and is treated as the higher risk. The bulletin says the effects have included an inability to maintain GNSS-based area navigation or required navigation performance.

EASA recommends training crews to recognise interference and to send a special air-report for a map shift, suspected spoofing, a lost or misleading position, or a time anomaly. Near a known affected area, crews should cross-check position without GNSS, confirm the aids the flight needs, be ready to use a non-GNSS procedure where that is appropriate, and report if the event is unexpected, if safety may be affected, or if they need help from air traffic control. For suspected spoofing, the bulletin adds a check of estimated position uncertainty, a comparison of GNSS time with another time source, and the manufacturer's own guidance. Its appendix includes a call that GNSS is unreliable, or may not be available, because of interference, jamming or spoofing. Where the airspace allows it, planning into a known affected area should include a non-GNSS procedure.

The North Sea on 9 November is not named in the bulletin. The RDI notice and the LVNL account reported by AeroTime both say safety held, by secondary systems or by controller assistance. Neither is a new cockpit procedure. Until an operator's manual says otherwise, the published baseline is the EASA one.

Sources

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